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BAR BRIEFS
that the opinion rule should have no application with respect to the admissibility of an admission of a party opponent but should go only to the
weight to be given it. Especially is this so since an opponent's admissions
may naturally include both facts and opinions or be couched solely in the
terms of an opinion. Strickland v Davis, 221 Ala. 247, 128 So. 233 (1930) ;
Read v Reppert, 194 Iowa 620, 190 N. W. 32 (1922); Hege & Co v Tompkins, 69 Ind. App. 273, 121 N. E. 677 (1919) ; N. J. Swain v Oregon Motor
Stages, 160 Ore. 1, 82 P. (2d) 1084 (1938); 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
(3rd ed. 1940) sec. 1053; Morgan, "The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945" (1946)
59 Harv. L. Rev. 481, 556. However, there is considerable authority to the
contrary. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Henderson, Inc. v Munn, 99 F. (2d)
190 (C.C.A. 4th, 1938).; Miller v Week, 186 Ky. 552, 217 S. W. 904 (1920) ;
Wright v Quattrochi,330 Mo. 173; 49 S. W. (2d) 3 (1932). The Wisconsin
court in an action against the master for injuries sustained by third party
guest, while riding in master's automobile at servant's invitation, and
resulting from servant's negligent operation of master's automobile, the
court, in affirming judgment for the master, commented upon a statement
made by the master to the Industrial Commission that the accident occurred
in the course of the servant's employment that the statement constituted
"only a conclusion of law to that effect as distinguished from an admission
of fact." Hanson v Engebretson et al, 237 Wis. 126, 294 N. W. 817 (1940).
While the Hanson case has been frequently cited as authority for applying
the limitations of the opinion rule to admissions of a party opponent, careful analysis of the case indicates that such a conclusion is unwarranted and
the mere fact that the admission violates the opinion rules does not necessarily affect the admissibility of it but only the weight to be given to it.
Cf. Hilton v. Hayes, 154 Wis. 27, 141 N. W. 1015 (1913).
While the principal case cannot be cited as an express approval of the
priniciple that the opinion rule has no application to party opponent admissions, it can be considered as representing a clear trend in that direction.
KEITH W. BLINN,

Professor of Law,
University of North Dakota.

ASSIGNMENT

OF CHOSES IN ACTION-TROVER AND

CONVERSION-CHATTEL

MORTGAGES. Fleming gave a promissory note secured by a chattel mortgage
on a quantity of corn to the Williams Bank, said Bank selling the note to
the Farmer's National Bank, without formal assignment of the chattel
mortgage which continued to stand in the name of the Williams Bank. The
purchaing Bank then sold the note to the Plaintiff. Subsequent to the
first purchase, but previous to the Plaintiff's purchase of the note, Fleming
sold the corn covered by the chattel mortgage to Beal, with the knowledge
of the Williams Bank. In an action to recover the amount of the unpaid
note, it was held, that the sale of the corn amounted to a conversion, and
the subsequent purchase of the note by the Plaintiff carried with it, as an
incident thereto, a cause of action for the precedent impairment of the lien.
The Plaintiff could recover in conversion, or recover damages for impairment to his lien, the ultimate result being the same. However, in the principal case, the Plaintiff had elected to ratify the sale of the corn and to
recover the proceeds of the sale; accordingly, Beal, the purchaser, is
absolved, and the Williams Bank is liable for the proceeds of the sale, the
action not being prosecuted against Fleming as he was insolvent. United
States v. Fleming, 69 F. Supp. 252 (Iowa 1946).
Many jurisdictions, in the absence of applicable statutes, adhere to the
rule of the common law that a cause of action for conversion is not assignable and this line of early decisions promulgating the resultant rule that an
assignment of a chattel mortgage does not operate as an assignment of a
cause of action for conversion of the security occurring previous to the
assignment of the note. Bowers v. Bodley, 4 Ill. App. 279 (1879) ; Gabbert
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v. Wallace, 5 So. 394 (1899); Hicks v. Cleveland, 39 Barb 573 (1863;
Overon v. Williston, 31 Pa. St. 155 (1858). A recent reiteration of the
statement has been made to the effect that "the assignment passes all the
mortgagee's right to the property, but does not pass his right to sue for a
conversion of the property or for injuries to it, while he
was the legal
owner of it," Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales, Bowers Ed.,
Sec. 510 (1933), citing Bowers v. Bodley supra; Miller v. Lanksheim Packing Co., 13 C. A. (2d) 315, 56 P. (2d) 1295 (1936); First National Bank v.
McCreary, 65 Ore. 484, 132 Pac. 718, 134 Pac. 1180 (1913). Inroads upon
the early common law principle that a cause of action in tort was not
assignable were made by the Statute of 4 Edw. III, Chap. 7, "which permitted the survivorship of certain actions ex delicto for injuries to personal
property; and survivorship was, by a later statute (3 & 4 Wm. IV, Chap.
42), prescribed for actions ex delicto for injuries to real property," 5 A.L.R.
130. Later decisions and authorities are in almost complete accord that a
cause of action for conversion is assignable based upon one of two theories;
that of survivability of the cause of action, survivability turning upon
whether or not the action involves, directly or indirectly, a property right,
5 A.L.R. 130 and cases cited, or whether the action is concerned with an
express or implied agreement and distinguishing between actions ex contractu and actions ex delicto, 5 C. J. 889, note 77; Schultz v. Christman,
6 Mo. App. 338 (1878). Thus it may be stated as a generally accepted rule,
with the observed qualifications, that a cause of action for conversion is
assignable. Zinn v. Denver Livestock Commisson Co., 68 Colo. 274, 187 Pac.
1033 (1920) ; 6 C.J.S. 1082, Sec. 34; 5 C.J. 889, note 78; 2 R.C.L. 610. It is
an elementary rule that "any person participating in an absolute sale of
mortgaged property, or doing any act with respect thereto in defiance of
the mortgagee's or the rightful owner's rights is liable for conversion,"
14 C.J.S. 885, Sec. 264. There are other authorities indicating that "the
assignee of a mortgage, providing the assignment is a legal one, has the
right to bring trover for its conversion, or to recover for injuries to it as
the mortgagee has before the assignment," 10 Am. Jur. 836, Sec. 182; 64
L.R.A. 618. However, the basis for the holding in the Zinn v. Denver Livestock Commission Co. case, supra, was not that there had been a legal
assignment of the cause of action, but that the cause of action for the
conversion occurring previous to the date of the assignment passed
to the assignee as an incident to the assignment of the chattel mortgage,
the court, in its decision, stated that the only citation to support the
theory of non-assignability was the Bowers v. Bodley case which was
based upon the common law prevailing in Illinois and that "the 'Plaintiffs
in error had an undoubted right of action (for conversion) as assignees of
the note and mortgage," so that it may be further stated that the cause
of action for conversion passes as an incident to the assignment of the
chattel mortgage irrespective of whether or not the parties to the assignment specifically intended the cause of action to pass. Kissick v. Kissick,
221 Mo. App. 420, 279 S. W. 764 (1926).
Accordingly, the rule in the
principal case is in complete accord with Zinn v. Denver Livestock Commission Co. and other earlier cases. Johnson, Nesbitt & Co. v. Gulf &
Chicago R. Co., 34 So. 357 (1903); McKeague v. Hanover Fire Insurance
Co., 81 N. Y. 38, 37 Am. Rep. 471 (1880).
North Dakota does not have an applicable decision in point with the
principal case; however, it is settled that a chattel mortgage does not
transfer title, nor does it confer an absolute right of possession upon the
mortgagee after condition broken. Until default, and possession is demanded
by the mortgagee, it is a mere lien, the office of which is security of a debt
or obligation, and whoever owns the debt secured is in fact the mortgagee,
since it is the debt owing which is secured by the instrument. The note is
but evidence of the debt and hence the owner of the debt as indicated by
possession of the note is entitled to all incidents 'of ownership, and the
person to whom the debt is owing is the beneficial mortgagee. Davis v.
Caldwell, 37 N. D. 1, 163 N. W. 275 (1917) ; James v. Wilson, 8 N. D. 186,
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77 N. W. 603 (1898). A number of provisions of the North Dakota Revised
Code of 1943 would bear upon the question indicated in the principal case
should it arise in this jurisdiction; Section 35-0208, provides that "the
assignment of a debt secured by a mortgage carries the security with it;"
Section 9-1101, "A right arising out of an obligation is the property of the
person to whom it is due and may be transferred as such; Section 47-0703,
"A thing in action arising out of the violation of a right of property or
out of an obligation may be transferred by the owner. Upon the death of
the owner, it passes to his personal representatives except in the cases
This
provided by law it passes to his devisees or successor in office."
latter statute was interpreted in Grabow v. Bergeth, 59 N. D. 214, 229
N. W. 282 (1930), where it was said that the obligation as used (in this
section) cpmprehends only legal duties resting upon contract or those
which arise by operation of law from a status or from relationships voluntarily assumed as distinguished from obligations which are imposed by
law. From this decision it follows that actions for general damages for
deceit, fraud, negligence, libel and slander do not survive and are not
assignable. Section 9-0721, "All things that in law or usuage are considered as incidental to a contract or as necessary to carry it into effect are
implied therefrom." It is settled that the assignee of a chose in action is
the real party in interest and may sue as such. Seybold v. Grand Forks,
5 N. D. 460, 67 N. W. 682 (1896). A demand and refusal is necessary to
maintain the action for conversion. Sanford v. Duluth & Dakota Elevator
Co., 2 N. D. 6, 48 N. W. 434 (1891); Kastner v. Andrews, 49 N. D. 1069,
194 N. W. 824 (1923) ; Marshail v. Gage, 8 N. D. 364, 79 N. W. 851 (1899) ;
however, where it is obvious from the evidence that a demand would be
unavailing, such demand is not necessary as a conditoin precedent to
maintaining the action. More v. Burger, 15 N. D. 345, 107 N. W. 200
(1906) ; Willard v. Monarch Elev. Co.,'10 N. D. 400, 85 N. W. 1135 (1901).
A further requirement exists in that the Plaintiff have and show a general
or special ownership in the property converted, and possession or a legal
right to immediate possesison at the time of the conversion. Parkerv. First
National Bank of Lisbon, 3 N. D. 87, 54 N. W. 313 (1892); Hellstrom v.
First Guaranty Bank, 49 N. D. 533, 191 N. W. 963 (1923). It is upon this
latter point that the decisions reach a definite conflict for it is obvious that
it is impossible for the assignee to meet the rigid qualifications of this
statement as the assignee would be unable to show possession or a right
to immediate possession since the conversion occurred prior to time of
creation of the assignee's interest. It follows that after assignment, the
assignor-mortgagee cannot maintain the action for the conversion of the
mortgaged property as the mortgagee's debt is paid in full upon execution
of the assignment and he has then no right to bring the action. Kissick v.
Kissick, 221 Mo. App. 420, 279 S. W. 764 (1926) ; Love- v. Mississippi
Cottonseed Products Co., 174 Miss. 697, 165 So. 446 (1936). The logical
conclusion based upon the reasoning of Bowers v. Bodley, supra, and the
line of decisions following this early case is that neither the assignor nor
the assignee of the chattel mortgage may maintain an action for a conversion occurring prior to the date of the assignment since the cause of action
for the conversion does not pass as an incident to the assignment of the
chattel mortgage. It is submitted as a preferable rule of law, and following
the decision in the principal case and Zinn v. Denver Livestock Commission
Co., 68 Colo. 274, 187 Pac. 1033 (1920), that the assignee of a mortgagee
may maintain an action for a conversion occurring prior to the date of the
assignment, on the premise that there is a civil action for every civil wrong
and that "the note is but evidence of the debt and hence the owner of the
debt, as indicated by possession of the note is entitled to all incidents of
ownership." Davis v. Caldwell, 37 N. D. 1, 163 N. W. 275 (1917).
DOUGLAS B. HEEN.

